http://ilp-www.mit.edu/ List of 40 most recent project additions, as compiled by the Industrial Liaison Office. en-us Copyright 2009 MIT ILP Tue, 24 Nov 2009 09:02:10 GMT http://ilp-www.mit.edu/favicon.ico http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_page.a4d?key=P5d http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20559 The high surface-to-volume ratios of nanoscale material structures makes them ideal for sensing and energy storage applications. For optimized functionality in these applications, nanostructures should be ordered and must be electrically interconnected. We are developing a broad range of methods for creation of ordered arrays of nanodots and nanowires with electrical connectivity and electronic functionality. These are being incorporated in both sensing and energy storage/buffering devices that can be integrated into low-power autonomous systems. 11/23/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20558 Self-assembly is an inexpensive patterning method for realizing nanoscale structures over large areas. In particular, self-assembly of functional nanoparticles, biomolecules, or macromolecules can create complex nanostructured devices with precisely tailored chemical or biological responses. By combining self-assembly with nanolithographically defined template structures, that serve to control and guide the self-assembly process, complex structures for applications in, for example, biomedical or environmental sensing, can be realized. Example of application: Nanoscale patterning and lithography, biosensing and functional biomaterials. 11/23/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20556 Graphene is revolutionizing electronics and solid state physics and is an ideal candidate for such advanced sensors. In this project, we will use graphene electronics to develop a new generation of sensing microsystems with unprecedented sensitivity. The growth of graphene wafers by chemical-vapor deposition will be optimized, and the technology and surface functionalization schemes required by graphene sensors will be developed. Finally, sensors based on graphene transistors, surface acoustic waves, and optical absorption devices will be demonstrated and integrated in a microsystem. Si and graphene control electronics will improve the specificity even further. Example of application: Analysis of the phenolic constituents in red wine or heavy metals in water. 11/23/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20557 Researchers are developing technologies that would enable autonomous sensing for biomedical and other applications. Energy for autonomous sensors can be harvested from environmentally available vibration and processed via intelligent, low-power control circuitry. Working closely with researchers who are creating energy storage devices to buffer energy from the scavenging device, they will develop systems capable of collecting information for either continuous broadcasting or periodic read out. Example of application: A self-powered sensor system that can be used for remote wireless sensing (i.e., self-powered accelerometer). Packaging will be explored for integrating MEMS and CMOS devices (fabricated in a standard off-the-shelf technology) together. 11/23/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20550 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20549 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20548 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20547 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20546 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20545 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20544 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20543 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20542 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20541 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20540 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20539 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20538 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20537 11/19/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20536 The goal is to develop surface treatments to reduce hydrate adhesion for flow assurance in subsea oil and gas applications by developing durable low-surface energy materials. The approach to this problem includes: (1) Experimentally evaluate nucleation parameters (critical radii, sub-cooling, barrier energy, rate) and growth kinetics (2) Prevent heterogeneous nucleation on walls by promoting homogeneous nucleation using nanoparticle seeds (3) Control growth of these nuclei by controlling number of seeds/unit volume, pressure gradients, etc. Benefits include: (1) Reduce expensive chemical and thermal treatment for flow assurance (2) Improve subsea system reliability and flow assurance (3) Extend pipe, valve and other components’ life (4) Prevent catastrophic failures (5) Enable ultra-deep water exploration by improving flow assurance (6) Enable safe extraction of methane hydrates (future energy source) 11/17/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20535 The goal of this project is to create a unified technology for sub-bottom fluid and gas switching. The focus of this project is to develop a unified technology for sub-bottom fluid and gas switching. This may include remote commands via acoustic/seismic channels or optical fibers, down-hole hydraulic or electrical power and equipment, in situ power generation from fluid/air flow, or non-traditional controls and actuation elements. In the first two years the objectives are to achieve a positive lock to prevent product backing up into the annulus through non-closure of the one-way valve, and to make the system less susceptible to errors in the bellows preload. So far, models have been developed for the pressure of the product in the tubing in quasi-steady state and for the behavior of a gas lift valve under varying injection gas pressures. The next steps include combining the pressure and valve models to study the interactions and to identify and study failure modes of the fluid-mechanical system. 11/17/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20534 Accurate description of the dispersion, collision and coagulation of bubbles suspended in a flow is of critical importance to ultra-deepwater oil and gas development and production. Our digital holographic imaging system gives three-dimensional flow measurements non-invasively, and provides accurate position and size information efficiently. The project consists of two fundamental parts, including optical setup and data processing. For the optical setup part, we have looked into two types of holographic imaging setups, in-line holography and off-axis holography. Comparison studies about system robustness, signal and noise analysis and high seeding density imaging capability have been carried out. An in-line holographic imaging system was built and holograms of air-water mixture flows were obtained. For the data processing part, we have identified three key components in this process, including hologram digital reconstruction, noise suppression image processing and feature detection. Fresnel propagation model is applied in our reconstruction algorithm. By applying bilateral filtering and locally adaptive thresholding image processing techniques, noises are greatly suppressed. In addition, we are developing feature detection metrics, which are based on combinations of optical and image criteria in order to provide more reliable measurements. 11/17/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20533 The main goal of the first phase of this project is to identify the combination of adhesive mechanisms: (1) Identify target pipe surface parameters such as roughness, hardness, and materials created by biological fouling or degradation of the surfaces; (2) Test the performance of each adhesion mechanism (micro-claw, magnetic, and van der Waals force) on various surface conditions such as depth, region, and different pipe materials; (3) Prototype modules based on candidate mechanism at size of one inch by one inch and test on sample surfaces underwater; and (4) Finalize the decision on the combination of technologies. 11/17/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20531 Promoting Nuclear Stability in South Asia is an ongoing effort to establish dialogs with analysts and policy makers in India and Pakistan on several issues related to nuclear stability in South Asia. Our initial trip to Pakistan and India in October 2005 was highly successful. During this trip, we presented a series of seminars and held discussions on the technical aspects of missile defense—which it seems is increasingly likely to be deployed in the region, a conceptual space-based missile launch surveillance system for nuclear risk-reduction, and weaponization of space. There are many aspects of these questions that have implications unique to the subcontinent and yet could benefit from Western experiences. The long-term stability of the region will depend on all the regional powers understanding the problems and the implications of their actions. We hope these dialogs will be one way India and Pakistan can start to address the multiple problems their status as nuclear powers presents. Moving forward, we will continue to establish contacts with and among Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese scientists, arms control and security experts, government officials, and military leaders. We also plan to undertake projects jointly with scientists and others in these countries to carry out technical analyses of the capabilities and implications of actual or proposed weapons systems, shared missile launch warning system and crisis management, command and control, operations, custody chain, basing and accident avoidance issues for nuclear weapons; develop proposals for confidence building and transparency vis a vis nuclear weapons deployment in India, Pakistan, and China; brief high-level decision makers in India, Pakistan, and China including members of Parliament in India and Pakistan; publish joint articles of both scientific and popular nature and establish a website for disseminating information. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20530 The Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group's work in BMD originated in the claims made by Dr. Nira Schwartz, a whistleblower from TRW, that the results of the first National Missile Defense (NMD) test, which allegedly showed that the NMD kill vehicle could easily discriminate the target from a set of eight simple “decoys” (although no intercept attempt was made), were in fact falsified. Postol’s work has confirmed Dr. Schwartz’s claims, and his suspicions were confirmed by several reports from the General Accounting Office. Professor Postol’s work has further uncovered involvement by MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory in an effort to suppress a government investigation into the allegations about the test. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20529 For more than ten years, the Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group has been the primary non-governmental organization analyzing the technical claims of the US Administration, the Congress, and others about the capabilities of BMD and the need for such defenses. A central focus of our work has been the question of how effective proposed missile defense systems could be expected to be in actual use and the implications of deploying less-than-highly-effective defenses. The Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group's technical analyses and findings have provided the basis of many of the arguments used by opponents of ill-considered missile defense programs. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20528 Over the years, numerous countries have tried to acquire weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons) and the means to deliver them. The paths they have taken to acquire these weapons are, of course, unique to each country. However, many of them share certain commonalities. This research project attempts to understand the factors that determine which path a country will follow in just how successful it might be. Is our belief the understanding the successful paths to acquiring weapons of mass destruction is the best way of figuring out how to stop them. This research cuts across all three categories of WMD as well as ballistic missiles to spot these commonalities. These include the acquisition of chemical biological and nuclear weapons by Iraq, Libya, and the United States as well as ballistic missile technology by India, Pakistan, and Iraq. A state faces a daunting challenge when trying to acquire WMD. First, it must not only acquire the weapon but also the means of producing significant quantities. (Here it differs from terrorists, which need only produce a few kilograms of chemicals or radioactive compounds or perhaps even just a few grams of biological agents.) Second, the secrecy surrounding WMD technologies would appear to be a major deterrent from a country acquiring. It certainly does introduce difficulties, but unfortunately our research has indicated that there are always people willing to sell even most deadly of technologies. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20527 Nuclear weapons, both those in the U.S. and in other countries of the world, represent new and unexplored challenges for the United States in the Post-Cold War world. Should we think about using them to combat the Weapons of Mass Destruction programs of developing countries? Are the weapons the US built and tested in the 1980s still viable in the 21st century? How many, if any, does the United States need to deter those states we have always considered potential nuclear threats from attacking us? Can the United States deter the emerging and potential nuclear powers, such as North Korea and Iran, from using nuclear weapons against us or our allies? Could the United States use conventional explosives in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to destroy so-called “High Value, Time Sensitive” targets such as a nuclear tipped missile being readied by a rogue state? Are group investigating these and other questions related to nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Nuclear Bunker Busters -- One area of research involves investigating the effectiveness of low yield nuclear weapons, or mini-nukes, to destroy underground WMD production facilities. In the first millionth of a second almost all of a nuclear explosion’s energy is released in the form of light and heat, predominantly soft X-rays. When the explosion is buried, this extraordinarily intense light and heat vaporizes vast quantities of the surrounding earth and rock, creating a “fireball” of fast-expanding superheated gas of vaporized bomb materials and surrounding earth. This fireball expands until its pressure is balanced by the weight of earth and rock above the explosion, creating a spherical cavity. A fireball generated by a 1 KT nuclear explosion roughly 20 meters deep in granite would just rise to the pre-explosion level of the ground. In the process of expanding, the fireball would, of course, have lifted most of the 20 meters or so of earth above it, causing much of it to be ejected from the crater where it will either land nearby or be carried off by local winds. Increasing the depth of a 1 KT bomb to 30 meters widens and deepens the crater at the same time it decreases the amount of radioactivity released. The fireball’s expansion also forms a maze of cracks and vents in the region immediately surrounding the initial cavity. This region, known as the rupture zone, extends nearly three times as far horizontally as it does below the cavity. When examined after an underground nuclear test explosion, these cracks and vents show evidence of burning and charring from the passage of super-heated gases from the fireball, indicating that an underground facility close enough to the detonation to lie inside the ruptured zone might be consumed by the nuclear conflagration. Reliability of the US Nuclear Deterrent -- The reliability of the US nuclear deterrent has recently been challenged by a number of critics who would like to see that the United States develop and test new nuclear weapons. It is, of course, vital that policy makers have absolute confidence in the nuclear weapons that form the basis of our deterrence. However, if those weapons are needlessly replaced with a new design—possibly with a new round of nuclear testing—significant damage would be done to the international taboo and developing new nuclear weapons that we have based our nonproliferation policy on for almost forty years. A secret debate, fiercely fought behind the closed doors of the nation’s weapons labs, erupted into the light of public scrutiny with the recent publication of a New York Times article: a handful of nuclear weapons experts believe that three-quarters of our submarine-based nuclear forces are duds: the so-called W-76 warhead. Critics of this design point to the fact that the radiation shell surrounding the W-76 is in places as thin as a “beer can”—what the critics claim is a design flaw and not related to aging. This, they claim, could cause what is known as a Rayleigh-Taylor instability, meaning that the expanding material and energy within the radiation shell causes the surrounding metal to breakup into irregular strands rather than a symmetrical surface. In turn, these irregularities would not focus the radiation to uniformly compress the inner fusion device, causing it to fail to react or react with a substantially lower yield. Using the correlation between publicly announced tests and the known periods of warhead development, it is estimated that there have been at least eight full-yield detonations of the W-76 warhead during and after development. From this, simple statistical laws set strict limits on the just how many duds there can be in the stockpile. Using very conservative numbers it can be said that, at the very least, 70 percent of the W-76s would detonate as planned. If, as many analysts believe, there are two or more warheads are already allotted for each target, then more than 90 percent will be destroyed. This is a worst-case scenario and the true fraction of weapons that would perform as planned is most likely considerably greater than 70 percent. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20526 The destruction of an ageing Chinese (on January 11, 2007) weather satellite and a dead US spy satellite (on February 20th, 2008), coming in rapid succession, have raised the prospect of an arms race in space. The US claims that its action was taken to save lives on Earth have not been fully documented by the US government. We have written a series of papers that cover the technical details of that action in an effort to increase transparency about this action and to provide the public with the only available detailed analyses of the potential dangers that satellite, USA-192, might have presented. Professor Forden has done a preliminary technical analysis of the proposed shoot-down of the errant spy satellite, USA 193. There is a high probability of casualties (3%) -- as compared with what is allowed in a controlled reentry -- and the legitimacy shooting it down would give other ASAT programs, in particular China’s. While it is impossible to calculate the probability of this test leading to an expansion of wars into space using kinetic kill weapons in the same way it is possible to calculate the expected casualties, there is a chance to exist and to be greater than 3%. And if humanity is denied access to space, which is a definite possibility if the debris from such a war leads to a catastrophic chain reaction of collisins, then there will be considerably more deaths from the lack of benefits that space provides than this satellite can possibly kill when it crashes. So unfortunately, the lesser of two evils -- either letting the satellite fall to Earth or legitimizing kinetic kill ASATs -- is to let it fall to Earth. In the future, however, we should work on not allowing this sort of situation to arise. In what was undoubtedly a multi-billion dollar satellite, it is criminal not to have some way of releasing toxic hydrazine in space even if the satellite was essentially dead. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20525 As a group, we have a common interest in the development of space programs in different countries. While our different research interests have taken us in different directions, we have, as a group, developed contacts in the space agencies in Europe, Russia, China, and India. Iran’s Space Launcher Development Program -- Iran has in recent years announced that it is developing a capability to put a satellite into orbit. This of course has created considerable concern in Western capitals that this same technology could be used to launch nuclear warheads. (See our discussion of how to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis here.) The launch of a Safir rocket on 17 August 2008, together with photographs of Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s visit to the Iranian Space Center, allows us to evaluate the technological path Iran is following in this development program. It is clear that Iran has jumped off the path of enlarging or “improving” SCUD technology. In particular, there are a number of important innovations Iran has made: (1) using cluster of engines for second stage using a SINGLE TURBOPUMP -- both are significant advances in technology all by themselves. The static test version shows two engines but it makes more sense for them to use 4 during the actual flight. It also looks like the turbopump can be used to facilitate staging by providing a small amount of acceleration during the second stage ignition. (2) looks like it uses gimbaled engines (see hydraulic jack) for thrust vector control -- another significant advance in technology, and the thing that probably failed during the test flight. (3) uses “new” engines (not SCUD or SA-2) -- speculation: why develop a new engine for SCUD fuel? It makes more sense to develop engines for a more powerful fuel such as UDMH. Analysis of the Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Test -- At 22:26 GMT, 11 January 2007, China slammed a kill vehicle into one of its dead metrological satellites, proving to the world that they were part of the small but unfortunately growing club of countries that can accomplish the difficult task of hypervelocity interceptions in space. As a signal to the world, this test highlighted both China’s technological prowess and the fact that China will not quietly stand by while the United States tries to expand its influence in the region with new measures such as the US-India nuclear deal. We have analyzed the orbits of the debris from this interception and from that put limits on the properties of the interceptor. We find that not only can China threaten low Earth orbit satellites, but, by mounting the same interceptor on one of its rockets capable of lofting a satellite into geostationary orbit, all of the US communications satellites. China's ASAT: No Space Age Perl Harbor -- China's nascent space weapons capability presents a challenge to the US dominance of space. But how should we respond? Should we develop space defenses? Or should we try to diplomatically limit the development of these weapons? These question are addressed in an analysis by Geoffrey Forden posted on Wired’s defense blog, DANGER ROOM on the one year anniversary of China’s ASAT test. Strategic Capabilities and Implications of China’s Navigation Satellites -- On the 27th of October, 2005, the first Iranian satellite (the Sinah-1, in a sun-synchronous orbit with an altitude of approximately 700 km) was launched aboard a Russian rocket. Clearly, more and more countries are attempting to join the Space-faring club. The group uses publicly available information (such as the satellite’s orbital parameters) to estimate the technical capabilities of these foreign satellites and from that infer their security implications. Previous studies have resulted in an understanding of the strategic implications of China’s indigenous navigation satellites and estimates for the current state of Russia’s space-based early-warning satellites. With the launch of the Bei Dou 1C satellite on 24 May 2003, China claims to have completed its constellation of three navigational satellites. This system is very different from the US navigation satellite system (GPS/NAVSTAR), the Russian GLONAS constellation and the planned European Galileo system. With only three satellites, and in geostationary orbit, the Chinese system can only be used on a regional basis as opposed to the global functionality of the others. Furthermore, assuming it uses the same operational principles as the other navigational systems - inferring the position of an operator by measuring the distance from a set of satellites - it appears to have only limited utility for navigation of terrestrial users. Since 1995, the constellation of Russian early-warning satellites has deteriorated significantly. Russia had a full complement of those satellites during the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident. Since then, Russia has not replaced satellites often enough to maintain complete 24-hour coverage. In fact, assuming every satellite -- even those that have drifted far from their optimal orbits -- is still working, Russian coverage has dropped to less than 17 hours per day. In reality, the coverage is probably considerably less. After all, Russia, and the Soviet Union before it, went to considerable effort to almost daily realign their early-warning satellites into a very precise formation to maintain the best surveillance of U.S. nuclear forces. Today, the satellites have been allowed to drift far from those optimal orbits, presumably because they no longer function. Orbital Debris: Drafting, Negotiating, Implementing a Convention -- It is time to recognize that while space may be infinite, Earth orbital space is a finite natural resource that must be managed properly. The problem we face with space pollution is complex and serious. The space treaties and conventions are not sufficient. They were drafted at the time of space exploration in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, they fail to account for rapid changes in the field, especially the increasing commercial activity. Moreover, the existing mitigation guidelines remain voluntary and are not legally binding under international law. As a result, space debris tends to accumulate and remains in orbit for a long period of time. A space debris convention is thus warranted. The proposed international convention would have the following objectives: 1) Implement an international and independent tracking and cataloguing system for space debris; 2) Adopt enforceable space debris mitigation and disposal guidelines; 3) Enforce a space preservation provision for protecting the most vulnerable outer space regions and; 4) Define a space debris compensation and dispute settlement mechanism. The convention must bring all together policy-makers and the civil society for addressing this problem; it is also time for the space industry to play its corporate social responsibility and to actively seek to participate to the drafting and implementing of the convention. More than ever, the space debris problem is hindering space commerce, space tourism, the scientific exploration of space, the use of raw materials from space, and even distant plans for the future settlement of space. The possibility of great harm posed by debris should bring all nations and stakeholders together to find the most appropriate solutions. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20524 A little known report issued in early 2005 by a group of experts might contain the seeds for solving the current Iranian crisis. The group, convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), examined the technical aspects of a number of options for multinationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle as a way of assuring all countries in good standing with the Nonproliferation Treaty access to peaceful nuclear technology. This has proved to be a key factor in Iran’s complaints with the West. Some of their suggestions, such as establishing “fuel banks” of low enriched uranium (LEU) under IAEA control to remove politics influencing who gets nuclear technology and who does not, are already starting to bear fruit. Both the United States and Russia have pledged to set aside surplus weapon’s grade uranium for down-blending into power plant fuel. Russia’s offer to enrich Iranian uranium into LEU is also a step down this path. Unfortunately, none of the proposals made so far seem to have given Iran enough assurance that it will be guaranteed access to peaceful nuclear technology to avert the showdown in the UN Security Council. However, another option examined by the IAEA experts group could guarantee Iran’s future nuclear fuel supply and prevent its abuse for military purposes. It would do this by constructing an enrichment facility on Iranian soil jointly owned and operated by Iran and Western governments. As a condition for this plant being built, Iran would pledge—and undertake additional safeguard requirements to verify—that it is not engaging in enrichment activities anywhere else; a pledge other countries have made under similar circumstances when they joined URENCO, a European enrichment consortium. Furthermore, the very nature of the joint venture would guarantee that Iran could not covertly divert any of the LEU or the plant’s enrichment capabilities for military purposes. Western technicians would be present at, and in fact jointly operate, the facility 24-hours per day, seven days per week; Western accountants would be monitoring all the business activities of the venture; and Western managers would be involved in all operating decisions. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20523 The MIT Space, Policy, and Society research group, founded by Professor David Mindell, studies the social and policy issues related to human spaceflight. The multidisciplinary group brings together engineers, historians, astronauts and policy analysts from MIT and beyond, and includes faculty from STS, Aeronautics and Astronautics, the Engineering Systems Division and the Technology and Policy Program. The current focus is on the future direction of human spaceflight in a global context. The group holds a regular seminar series with guest speakers ranging from NASA administrators to space journalists. In a graduate-level class students research policy issues in human spaceflight. Given the critical policy questions that must be addressed in the next few years, including the decision to retire the space shuttle and return humans to the moon by 2020, the group published a white paper addressing the key issues and options for human spaceflight in the second decade of the 21st century. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20522 Over the past decade and a half the Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group (formerly known as the Security Studies Program's Technical Working Group), led by Professor Ted Postol has established itself as the world's leading independent center for analysis of technical problems in the international security field. The Group has unrivaled expertise in nuclear weapons and their effects, sensor technologies, ballistic missiles, early warning systems, basing of nuclear forces, nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel cycle issues and how these technical matters shape the political, military and diplomatic dimensions of security. They have ongoing collaborations with technical groups and leading scholars in China, Russia, Germany, India, Israel and Pakistan — and also have extensive governmental and non-governmental contacts with individuals and organizations in the UK, France, and Norway. The Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group (STGS) believes that public policy is best influenced by sound, non-partisan analyses of the technical issues important to today’s security problems. STGS produces and encourages such analysis by conducting research on a number of specialized topics and by helping to build an international community of scientific scholars focused on this work. 11/13/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20520 11/09/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20519 11/09/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20518 11/09/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20517 11/09/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20516 11/09/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20515 11/09/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20514 11/09/09 http://ilp-www.mit.edu/display_project.a4d?projectId=20513 11/09/09